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Abstract
Internet has changed and improved the way of working in organizations and
businesses, at the same time this large network also opened doors for attackers as new
attacks are emerging day by day. To protect the organizations and systems from
these attacks, network security comes into action. Network security is the policy
made by the administrator by running security software or installing appliances in
the network in order to protect the network and its resources from security threats.
In network security, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one of the popular
and effective mechanism to secure the network. The aim of IDS is to offer a
layer of protection against unauthorized (or malicious) uses of systems by sensing
the vulnerability in the system or misuse of a security policy, and alerts system
administrator to an ongoing (or recent) attack. IDSs function is limited to detect
the intrusion and respond to administrator about the intrusion by monitoring the
system continuously. IDS is not able to preserve evidence about the intrusion,
which makes it difficult to see the damage in the system and gather information
about the attack and hence make it impossible to catch the intruder. Although
evidence can be collected from IDS’s and system log files, but integrity, reliability,
and completeness of such evidence are doubtful as log files can also be altered by
an intruder.
In order to preserve evidence in its original form, we have proposed Application
of Intrusion Detection System in automatic Evidence Collection using Digital
Forensics. In our model whenever an intrusion is detected, IDS notifies the
administrator by sending an alert as well as activate the digital forensic tool to
capture the current state of the system. This captured system image contains all
the information about the system of the time when the attack was taking place.
Hence such image can be used as evidence in legal proceedings. We used both
signature based IDS and anomaly based IDS in the work and observe that signature
based IDS is not able to detect novel threats while anomaly based IDS is able to
detect such threats.
Keywords: Intrusion detection system, digital forensics, digital evidence, signature, anomaly,
forensic analysis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Network Security
The web has enormously enhanced and converted the way of working of businesses,
in the meantime, this huge network and technologies associated with it expanded the
amount of security dangers from which organizations must be protected. Security
has developed in two different directions one is data security and other is network
security [1]. Although network threats are more serious for the organizations that
store delicate information, for example, money related or medical records, individual
data, the outcomes of dangers on any element differ from a bit awkward to completely
incapacitating. Consequences of the attack can be loss of important data, privacy
violation, and hours or even days of network or system downtime. Because of more
network vulnerabilities and equipped hackers the risk of network related attacks
are growing and becoming a serious concern [2]. Considering the importance of
security, Internet is a dangerous means of vulnerability so the risk involve in it
should be looked carefully and security measures should be taken. Network security
is a very challenging area in the modern world, consists of policies and provisions [3]
implemented by the administrator to stop unwanted access, disavowal, and alteration
or misuse of the available network assets. Attackers do various malicious activities
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to break the security protocol of the network. Security for a network has a number
of solutions to protect the network.
 Anti-spyware and anti-virus.
 Firewall- to protect the network from unauthorized access.
 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) - to detect suspicious activities.
 Virtual Private Networks (VPN) - to give safe access in a client-server
environment.
1.1.1 Necessity of Security
Security gives a secure platform for users, programs and computers to perform their
noteworthy work in a secured environment. A protected system secures its clients
from worms, Trojan Horses, and viruses as they are sufficiently dangerous to take all
the stored data from the system or occupy the system asset. Security is necessary
to achieve following goals.
Authentication: Authentication enables the user to ensure the identity of the
other user to which it is communicating [4]. A simple way to conduct authentication
is by using user login passwords, biometrics and digital certificates and single sign-on
(SSO) systems [5].
Confidentiality: Confidentiality makes the data distant to unauthorized user by
guaranteeing that the data send by confirmed gathering does not get spilled or
revealed to any unauthorized person or system [4]. A condential message means
does not reveal its meaning to an eavesdropper [6].
Data integrity: Data integrity ensures that the received data is not modified
or altered by the adversary during transmission [4]. Integrity can be ensured by
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controlling the physical environment, maintaining precise authentication policies,
and restricting access to data [6].
Non-repudiation Non-repudiation guarantees that a party cannot deny the
information provided on a document or legitimacy of their signature or sending
of a message that is actually originated by them [4].
1.1.2 Threats to Network Security
New threats to security are emerging consistently. These threats can be slightly
harmful or can be fully devastating. Major security threats are:
Buffer overflow A buffer overflow happens when more data is supplied to buffer
than it can hold by a process. Buffer overflow may happen accidentally through
programming error or intentionally to launch an attack. It is an attack on integrity
constraint of security. In these attacks, the additional data can be the code intended
to do particular noxious activities.
Backdoor trojan It creates a backdoor in the system in order to get in to it.
The backdoor Trojans are too dangerous as they have the ability to access machines
remotely and may gain administrative privileges. Backdoor Trojan allows hackers
to virtually sit at the victims keyboards.
Denial of Service attack A Denial of Service (DoS) attack, prevent legitimate
users from accessing desired resources which were intended for them such as network
bandwidth and web services. DoS attack is done by disrupting a legitimate
users connectivity or services by exhausting bandwidth, router processing capacity,
sockets, memory, CPU, I/O bandwidth, and database/disk bandwidth [7]. Flooding
is a very common way to do this is.
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Arbitrary code execution It is a vulnerability in the system that can be used
by an attacker to run any script or program on a target machine. The attacker can
do it by injecting malicious code into the process, which when run code get executed
automatically.
Privilege escalation It is the process of gaining access to protected resources
by misusing operating system bugs. Privilege escalation enables an application to
perform more unauthorized actions with more privileges.
SQL injection SQL injection is an important vulnerability in web applications,
which is present in applications that suffer from insufcient input validation. To
exploit this vulnerability the attacker injects a piece of malicious SQL query into
the application through the variables used in the application. Then web applications
will send these queries to the database server where they get executed along with
the legitimate query. A successful SQL injection attack can enable the attacker to
read, insert, update, execute and delete SQL queries on the database [8].
1.1.3 Solutions to achieve Network Security
In order to deal with the security threats number of solutions have also emerged and
still emerging day by day. Some popular security solutions are:
Intrusion detection system
It is a hardware appliance or a software designed to monitor the traffic in the network
to find unusual or unauthorized activities and informs the system administrator. IDS
have turned into a vital addition to the security for most of the organizations. Apart
from detection many IDS can also respond to an attack to stop it. A number of
techniques can be used such as IDS preventing itself from attack, change the security
rules, or change the content of attack data [9].
5
Chapter 1 Introduction
Firewalls
A firewall is a set of devices or programs designed for filtering the traffic flowing
through it. In firewall, set of rules are written to filter the traffic to pass or deny.
It is located at a network gateway server to protect the resources of the network
from the outside world. A firewall protects networks from unauthorized access by
denying the malicious traffic while permitting authentic traffic to pass. A network
firewall makes an overpass between the network that is being protected and an
outside network, such as the public Internet [5].
Honeypot
A honeypot is a computer system or device on the Internet that is specifically set
up to attract and trap the people who try to penetrate others systems or network.
A honeypot allows evil patterns to enter into the network so that their activities
can be examined to further enhance the quality of the of the system. The prime
function of a honeypot is to analyze the attacker’s behavior to conduct and launch
the attack. Unlike firewalls that uses defensive security mechanism, honeypot work
on offensive security mechanism [10].
1.1.4 Difference between IDS and Firewall
In the beginning firewalls gave good solution to secure the network. Limitation of
the firewall was found later that a firewall makes traffic flow control decision by
analyzing data packet header, but do not analyze the entire data of the packet.
This limitation makes firewalls insufficient to protect the network on their own,
although they are essential components of network security. These inefficiencies can
be overcome by deploying the IDS either inside or outside the firewall.
 Firewall analyzes packet headers and applies protocol type based policy,
addresses and ports while IDS analyzes entire packets including header and
data, searching for malicious events.
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 An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detects unwanted attempts, whereas
Firewall blocks unauthorized connections.
 IDS uses Signature and behaviour matching to detect the attacks, whereas
Firewall scan the packets and block or allow the traffic based on the source
and destination addresses.
 The firewall can be thought as a security guard and IDS as a security camera
at the entrance.
1.2 Introduction to Intrusion Detection System
(IDS)
When a hacker or system user exploits or breaks into the system by taking illegal
action, is called intrusion. The intruder may be an insider or an outsider, who does
malicious activities or actions in an unauthorized manner. Intrusion detection is
a process of finding unauthorized activities (intrusion) by inspecting the inbound
traffic. Intrusion detection involves observation and analysis of user and system
activities, auditing of vulnerabilities and configurations of the system, evaluating
the integrity of data files and critical system, statistical analysis of activity patterns,
analysis of abnormal activities, and audit of operating system [11].
First concepts about Intrusion Detection System (IDS) was given in the early 80s
by James P. Anderson. Intrusion detection system can be a physical appliance or
security software to monitor the network traffic in order to detect suspicious activity.
Many IDS keep information about the detected intrusions in a log file for further
analysis or to combine these logs with other data to make policy and decisions. Most
of the intrusion detection system detects suspected intrusion and then informs to the
system administrator by sending an alert. Originally IDS was thought as a single,
stand-alone system based on audit records processing based detection. Today IDS
is a distributed system which contains multiple systems combined together [12].
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1.2.1 Architecture of Intrusion Detection System
The generalized architecture of IDS is shown in Figure 1.1 [13]. A general IDS
consists of three basic components.
Figure 1.1: Generalized architecture of IDS.
Sensors
The sensor or an event generator is the component responsible for data collection.
The event generator is responsible to take packets from large outside network and
provide them to the IDS in form of events [14]. For example, event generators might
be simple filters that take audit trails, observe a network and create relevant events
for the packets in the network, or application code in a database which generates
events describing database transactions.
Analyzers
The raw data collected by the sensors is submitted to the analyzers to classify either
as an attack or dismissed as safe. Analyzer contains two components, detection
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engine and knowledge base. Detection engine filters information and throw-outs
irrelevant data found by event generator. The analyzer has a knowledge base
that comprises the information such as profiles of normal system behavior, attack
signatures, essential attributes (i.e. thresholds). Initial analysis determines severity
of the attack, then further analysis determines scope, intention, or frequency of the
attack. A significant amount of historical data storage may require for accurate
analysis. Good analyzer can correlate two attacks or determine the inappropriate
correlation [15].
Monitor
It is an interface to send a notification to the administrator about the threat detected
by IDS. Adjustment of the monitor must be done according to the network traffic.
1.2.2 Classification of IDS
Intrusion detection elements can be categorized according to its primary components
and assumptions [9]. Intrusion detection systems can be categorized based on five
parameters:
(i) Intruder Type
(ii) Detection methodology
(iii) Deployment based
(iv) Detection Behavior
(v) Processing of collected data
Classification of IDS based on above five parameters is shown below in Figure 1.2 [9].
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Figure 1.2: Classification of Intrusion detection system.
(i). Intruder type
IDS classified based on the users (intruders) are of two types, internal and external.
External intruders don’t have any authority to use the machine they attack. On
the other hand internal intruders have limited authority to the machine, but try
to perform additional activities (i.e. Administrative activities) for which they are
not authorized. Internal intruders are of three type masqueraders, misfeasor and
clandestine [16].
 Masquerader is a person who enters into a system’s access control to exploit
the account of a legitimate user.
 Misfeasor is a genuine user who accesses resources, programs, or data for which
such access is not authorized, or misuses the privileges of the authorized access.
 Clandestine user is a person who takes hold of system’s supervisory control and
uses it to avoid the auditing and access controls or to destroy audit collection.
10
Chapter 1 Introduction
Clandestine intruders are most dangerous one.
(ii). Detection method based
An IDS that detects intrusion according to security policies, are based on one
of the detection methodologies. Based on detection methodology IDS are either
Signature-based or anomaly-based. More than one detection methods are used, in
maximum intrusion detection techniques for more accurate and broad detection.
Signature based: Signature based intrusion detection systems use known attacks
signature to detect intrusion. Signature based detection is also known as misuse
detection. In this approach, at first abnormal activities (signature) are defined, and
any other undefined is treated as normal activity. A signature is a pattern related to
some known attack. This detection methodology matches the signatures of observed
events to known attack signatures to identify attack [17]. This method of intrusion
detection is the simplest one. Examples of signatures are as follows:
 An attempt of Telnet login with root username, which violates the security
policy of any organization.
 An e-mail with freepics.exe file attached, which contains malware
characteristics.
 An OS log file entry having status code 645, which indicates disabled host’s
auditing.
Procedure for signature based detection is shown in Figure 1.3 [18].
Signature based IDS can be classified into further categories based on the
techniques used such as string matching, simple rule based, state modeling based,
expert system based [19]. Signature based detection is quick and effective for
identifying known attacks yet profoundly inadequate in detection unknown attacks,
different variants of known attacks, and attacks masked by some evasion techniques.
For instance, if an attacker changed the malware in above mentioned example to use
11
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Figure 1.3: Signature based detection system.
a filename of ”my freepics.exe” rather than ”freepics.exe” than a signature searching
for ”freepics.exe” will treat it as different and hence will not match. It fails to detect
truly new attacks, also known as novel attacks.
Anomaly based: Anomaly based detection is the methodology of collating the
definitions of a new activity against the normal activity to find the deviations. This
is based on statistical behavior modeling. Normal operations of the members are
profiled and a certain amount of deviation from the normal behaviour is hailed as an
anomaly. An IDS using anomaly based detection represents the typical behaviour of
things, for example, hosts, users, applications, or network connections by utilizing
the profiles. The profiles are created by observing the normal activities over a certain
period of time. Case in point, a profile for a system may indicate that 17% of network
bandwidth is used by the internet border for the Web activity on an average during
a normal day. The IDS then compare the incident activity’s attributes to thresholds
defined in the profile. For example, when Web activity consumes bandwidth more
than 17%, then IDS treats it as intrusion sent an alert to the administrator for
the anomaly. Profiles can be generated for numerous behaviour, for example, the
number of failed login attempts for a host, the number of e-mails sent by a user, and
usage of processor for a host in a given duration.
Profiles are developed by monitoring the system and network for a certain period
of time (typically days, sometimes weeks). Anomaly based IDS can have either static
12
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profile or dynamic profile. Static profile does not changed while a dynamic profile
updates regularly when new events occur. Procedure for anomaly based detection
is shown in Procedure for anomaly based detection is shown in Figure 1.4 [18].
Figure 1.4: Anomaly based detection system.
The advantage of anomaly based detection is that it is suitable to detect novel
attacks. Case in point, assume that a computer gets contaminated with a malware.
The malware could devour the processing resources of computer, initiate large
number of connections, send e-mails or perform other activities that are different
from normal activities of the computer.
Some common examples of attack that can be detected by anomaly based IDS
but not by signature based IDS are Probe attack, DoS (Denial of Service) attack,
R2L (Remote to Local) attack, U2R (User to Root) attack etc.
 Probe attack: The probe attacks are intended to acquire the information about
the target network. Examples of probe attack are port-scan, ping-sweep,
etc [20].
 DoS (Denial of Service) attack: It is a sort of attack on a system that is
planned to flood the system or network and force the target system to stop
the service(s) by flooding it with futile data. Examples of DoS attack are
ping-of-death, teardrop, smurf, SYN flood, etc [21].
 R2L (Remote to Local) attack: Unauthorized access from a remote machine.
13
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The R2L attacks are most troublesome to identify as they contain the network
level characteristics (duration of connection and service requested) and the
host level characteristics (number of failed login attempts). Example of R2L
attack is guessing passwords [20].
 U2R (User to Root) attack: Unauthorized access to local superuser privileges
by a local unprivileged user. The U2r attacks contains the semantic points of
interest that are extremely testing to find at a beginning stage. Such attacks
target an application and are often content based. Examples of U2R attacks
are various buffer overflow attacks [20].
Main problem with an anomaly based IDS products is unintentionally inclusion of
malicious activity in the profile. Another problem is generating accurate profiles
because of complex computing activity. Anomaly based IDS frequently generates
more false positives simply on the grounds that the benign activities show huge
deviation from profiles, particularly in more dynamic or different situations. Another
significant issue with the anomaly based detection system is that, it is troublesome
for analyst to find the cause of particular alert, to correctly validate an alert, because
of the amount of events and complex nature of events that may have caused the
alert. [17].
Anomaly based IDSs are further divided into three categories are as follows:
Statistical based: In statistical based anomaly intrusion detection systems,
the network traffic is captured and after that a profile of its stochastic behaviour
is produced. As the network operates in normal conditions (without any attack),
a reference profile is created. After that, the network is monitored and profiles
are generated and an anomaly score is generated by collating it to the reference
profile. If the score passes a certain threshold, the IDS will flag an occurrence of
the anomaly [22]. Any one of three statistical methods, univariate, multivariate, or
time series model can be used.
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Knowledge based: Knowledge based anomaly IDSs rely on the availability of
the prior knowledge (data) of the network parameters in normal operating condition
as well as the one under certain attacks [22]. Knowledge base used in IDS may be
expert systems, description languages(UML), finite state machines, data clustering.
Machine learning based: In machine learning based anomaly IDSs, an
explicit or implicit model of the analyzed patterns is generated. These models
are updated periodically, in order to improve the intrusion detection performance
on the premise of the past results. Machine learning techniques such as Bayesian
networks, Markov model, fuzzy logic, genetic algorithm, neural networks, or principle
conponent analysis can be used [22].
(iii). Deployment based
IDS can be deployed on a individual host or in a segment of the network. Based on
the deployment, IDS can be of following types:
Host based IDS (HIDS): Host-based IDS observes the characteristics of an
individual host and the events happening on that host for malicious actions. The
HIDS is generally deployed to the critical hosts to provide protection by monitoring
the system entities and their attributes. Such systems typically make use of the
information specific to operating systems of the target machines. HIDS monitors
incoming and outgoing wired and wireless network traffic, system logs, running
processes, file access and modification, system and application configuration changes.
HIDS reports intrusion by writing logs, sending e-mails, etc. HIDS use database to
store objects and attributes. Host-Based IDS can be divided into four types [23]:
 File system monitors: Systems checking the integrity of les and directories.
 Log file analysers: Systems analyzing log les for patterns showing malicious
activity.
15
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 Connection analysers: Systems that monitor connection attempts from and
to a host.
 Kernel based IDSs: Systems that detect kernel level suspicious activity.
HIDS has an advantage that it provides detailed information about the attack
and is also known as System Integrity Verifier. HIDS is also have some limitations
such as HIDS itself can be attacked (If an attacked host is down, then HIDS is
also down), local installation on each host, and much host resources are needed [24].
Despite the fact that HIDS is much superior to NIDS in detecting malicious activities
for an individual host yet they have restricted perspective of network topology and
henceforth can’t detect attacks that is focused for another host in a network where
HIDS installed [25]. HIDS products such as Emerald eXpert-BSM, Dragon Squire,
Intruder Alert, NFR HID, and Snort are popular.
Network Based IDS (NIDS): A network based IDS generally contains network
device with a Network Interface Card (NIC) that operates in promiscuous mode.
The IDS is placed on the boundary or along a network segment to monitor most
of the traffic on that network segment. NIDS can be passively deployed, without
many changes to networks or systems. NIDS are very effective for monitoring both
outbound and inbound traffic. Load balancing in NIDS allows it to efficiently utilize
the processing power of the nodes in a distributed system for scalability [26]. A
single NIDS is able to protect the entire network and turning off a target system will
not affect the NIDS. But NIDS cannot monitor the network if the system bandwidth
is overloaded [24].
Hybrid IDS: Hybrid IDS improves HIDS technology by making it capable to
monitor the network traffic flowing through the host, either into or out from
individual host. Hybrid agents unite the functionality of HIDS with network based
sensor technology that is just to analyze the network traffic focused to the particular
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host where the hybrid agent is installed. The processor utilization in a hybrid agent
is much more than a host-based agent [27].
(iv). Processing of collected data
Data are collected from one or more sources in intrusion detection systems. Collected
data is stored and processed to detect intrusion. Based on storage and processing
IDS can be classified as follows:
Centralized IDS: A centralized IDS is a system where the data analysis is
performed in a fixed number of places, that does not depend on the number hosts
are being monitored. Location is considered of only analysis components. Some
examples of centralized IDS are: IDES, IDIOT, NADIR, and NSM [28].
Distributed IDS: A distributed IDS is the system where the data analysis is done
at numerous locations, may be equivalent to the number of hosts that are being
monitored. Locations and number are considered of just the analysis components,
not the collection components. Some examples of distributed IDS are: DIDS, GrIDS,
EMERALD, and AAFID [28].
Hierarchical IDS: This is proposed for multi-layer (clustering) network
infrastructures. Cluster heads (CHs) are responsible for monitoring their member
nodes, as well as participating in the global intrusion detection decisions.
(v). Detection behavior
Based on detection behavior IDS can be classified as follows [9]:
Attempted break-ins: Detected by common behaviour profiles or by security
constraint violations.
Masquerade attacks: Also detected by common behaviour profiles or by security
constraint violations.
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Penetration of the security control system: Detected by searching for
particular activity patterns.
Leakage: Detected by common utilization of system resources.
Malicious use: Detected by common behaviour profiles, utilization of special
privileges, by security constraint violations.
1.2.3 Placement of IDS in network
Depending on the network topology, IDS can be placed at one or more places as
shown in Figure 1.5 [29]. All traffic travels through an IDS sensor when the IDS is
Figure 1.5: Placement of Intrusion Detection System in Network.
placed in an inline configuration. Effectiveness of an IDS can be improved if all traffic
passes through the sensor. When IDS is not configured in an inline configuration,
it sends a reset packet to the network to terminate the malicious session [29]. It
likewise relies on what kind of intrusion activities are to be detected: outside, inside
or both. If outside intrusion activities need to be detected, and only one router is
connected with the web, the best place for an IDS is inside the router or a firewall.
If there are different paths to the web, one IDS might be put at every passage point.
Then again, if inner threats need to be detected, IDS can be placed at each network
segment. More number of IDS mean more work and more maintenance expenses.
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1.2.4 Characteristics of IDS
An IDS should have the following characteristics, irrespective of what mechanism,
it is based on:
 It must run consistently without human intervention. The system must be
capable to run in the background of the system that is being monitored.
 It should not work as a “black-box”. Its internal functionalities should be
examinable for outsiders.
 It must be fault tolerant.It must cope even in system crash and its information
base remade should not be required at restart.
 It must oppose subversion. They should have the capacity to monitor itself to
guarantee that it has not been destabilized.
 It must impose less overhead on the system. It should not slow down the
computer.
 It must be able to observe significant deviations from typical system behaviour.
 It must be effortlessly customized to the system. It should be able to adapt the
diverse use of pattern and defense mechanism effectively as they are distinctive
for each system.
 It must survive with change in system behaviour and the environment over the
time as new applications and advance technologies are continuously included.
1.3 Introduction to Digital forensics (DF)
Digital forensics (also known as digital forensic science) is a branch of forensic
science deals with the recovery and investigation of materials found in digital
devices. Digital Forensics Investigation is a methodology of determining and relating
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concentrated data and digital evidence to find accurate data for legal proceeding [30].
Forensic science is characterized as ”the application of science and engineering in the
law” [31]. Actually an investigation is partitioned into a few sub-extensions, based on
the kind of digital devices included, network forensics, computer forensics, mobile
device forensics, forensic data investigation. DFRWS (Digital Forensic Research
Workshop) characterized Digital forensics as Use of scientifically derived and
proven procedures for the collection, preservation, validation, analysis, identification,
interpretation, and documentation of digital evidence found from digital sources for
the purpose to facilitate the reconstruction of events found to be suspicious, or
to help in anticipation of unauthorized actions shown to be disturbing to normal
operations [32].
Increasingly the world is becoming dependent on the information derived from
digital sources, computer systems, and networks involved in storing, processing, and
transmitting data. This growing dependence drives development to advance required
technology. Figure 1.6 shows the area where digital forensic comes into action [32].
Figure 1.6: Area of application of digital forensics.
1.3.1 Fundamental principle in Digital forensic investigation
Core IT Security has fundamental principles as Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability. Similarly, digital forensics investigation also has core principles to view
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the fundamental concept of different digital forensic investigation techniques. The
core principles in digital forensic investigations are as follows:
 Reconnaissance: This is an observation of actions to be taken to secure and
collect digital evidence in such a manner that they should not affect integrity
of evidence. For this, forensics investigator uses different tools, methods, and
practices specially developed for that and store on different storage media to
make readable evidence [33].
 Reliability: Data extraction is not simply to save files to a disk or copying the
data. Evidence-chain should be preserved during extraction, analysis, storage
and transportation of data to make the forensic process reliable [33]. Trained
persons should be appointed to conduct an examination of digital evidence.
 Relevancy: Relevancy of the evidence with the case may affect the usefulness
and weight of the evidence, even though for admissible evidence [33]. For better
and controlled investigation, advice from legal practitioner should be taken on
what should be collected, time and cost spent during the process [34].
1.3.2 Digital Forensic Model
Several models for digital forensic investigation have been proposed. One most
popularly used model of them is given in Figure 1.7 [35].
Figure 1.7: Digital Forensic Investigation Model.
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Readiness phases
The concept of forensic readiness for a system describes the capability of the
system to efficiently collect credible digital evidence that can then be used in legal
proceedings [36]. Readiness phase is responsible to verify the ability of infrastructure
and operations to support an investigation completely. It combines two phases:
 Operations Readiness phase, that ensures human capacity, whether it is
capable or not to deal with incoming incidents.
 Infrastructure readiness phase, that ensures the infrastructure is sufficient or
not to deal with incoming incidents.
Deployment phases
Deployment phase provides a mechanism and set up for detection and confirmation
of an event. It also combines two phases:
 Detection and Notification phase, that detects the incident and notify
investigator about it.
 Confirmation and Authorization phase, that verify the occured incident and
take authorized legal approval for the investigation.
Physical Crime Scene Investigation phases
Physical crime scene investigation phase is responsible for the collection and analysis
of the physical evidence and reconstruction of the actions that took place during the
occurrence of events. It contains six phases such as preservation phase, survey
phase (taking photographs, sketches, and videos), documentation phase, search and
collection phase, reconstruction phase, and presentation phase.
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Digital Crime Scene Investigation phases
Digital Crime Scene Investigation phase is responsible for the collection and analysis
of the digital evidence found either from the previous phase or from any other source
of evidence collection. This phase is similar to physical crime scene investigation
phases, but this phase mainly focuses on the digital evidence.
Review phase
This phase reviews the whole investigation process and identifies areas where
improvement is needed.
1.3.3 Relevant Forensic Techniques:
Some popularly used forensic techniques are discussed below.
Imaging
A first technique used in a digital forensics investigation is to copy, or image the
media that is to be examined. Once the image of media is captured then it
can be used for further investigation to search the evidence. The problem with
this technique is that media can be modified without care and such modification
compromise the integrity of the evidence slightly. To deal with this problem a trained
investigator is needed to have complete knowledge of behaviors of the different
operating system so that stored data will not be overwritten accidentally [34].
Hashing
Hashing is a technique to provide authenticity that a file or image was not
modified by identifying it quickly. Cryptographic hashing is mostly used by forensic
community. Cryptographic functions such as MD5 or SHA-1 [4] are used. The
forensic community uses MD5 in most tools because it was faster and produced a
shorter hash review [34].
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Carving
Carving is the process of scanning of disk blocks to find deleted data that do not
belong to current files. Carvers are the tools used for it, combine inodes into the
original files that were deleted by using known header and footer signatures [37].
Carving can only recover deleted file, but not overwritten or temporarily cached
files on media. Recent advances in carving allows fragmented files to be recovered
more accurately.
1.3.4 Limitation of Digital Forensics
Digital Forensics is becoming irrelevant as hard-won capabilities are in danger of
being reduced or even lost as the result of advancement and fundamental changes
in the computer industry [38]. Some limitations of digital forensics are as follows:
 The size of storage devices is increasing; this means that create a forensic
image of devices, or process all of the data found in it is becoming frequently
inefficient and highly time consuming.
 The increasing incidence of embedded flash storage and the rise in production
of hardware interfaces indicates that storage devices can no longer be imaged
or removed readily.
 Increase in production of OSs and file formats has also increased the need of
complex data exploitation tools and hence the tool development cost.
 Now days, most of the cases require the analysis of multiple devices to gather
evidence followed by the correlation of gathered evidence in various devices,
instead of previous cases where analysis of a single device was sufficient.
 Pervasive encryption problem is there, that means data cannot be processed
frequently, even when it can be recovered.
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 Data or code cannot even be found frequently in the case of the cloud used for
remote storage and processing.
 Expensive memory (RAM) forensic is needed for malwares that are not written
to persistent storage.
 Legal challenges increasingly limit the scope of forensic investigations.
1.3.5 Digital evidence and its admissibility
Credible digital evidence is the data collected and preserved by a process that
validate the legitimacy of that data. A number of factors are given below, which
determine requisite scientific validity of digital evidence.
 Whether the concepts and techniques used by the scientific expert have been
tested.
 Whether review and publication of digital evidence have been done.
 Whether the techniques used by the scientific expert have a known error rate.
 Whether they are up to standards of applications governed by them.
 Whether the concepts and techniques used by the scientific expert are widely
accepted.
If digital evidence survives the above challenges, it may still have to get through
several difficulties regarding the collection, processing, storage and presentation of
the digital evidence. Digital evidence requires a proper foundation for introduction.
Generally, digital evidence can be introduced as “party is offering the sufficient
computer information in order to certify a finding that such information is truthful
and the same opportunity is given to the opposite party to inquire the accuracy
of the computer and input procedures used to collect information to validate the
accuracy of on paper business records” [39].
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1.4 Combination of IDS and Digital Forensics
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Digital Forensics (DF) are two broad areas in
the computer world. Both of the above are used in computer and network security
to protect and secure the system, network, or organizations. First one is used to
detect the intrusion or attack in order to prevent the damage in the given system or
network, whereas later one is used to analyze the attacked or compromised system
in order to find the amount of damages occurred, cause of the attack and strategies
used in the attack. Both intrusion detection system and digital forensics have an
application in one another.
Digital forensics is a process of collecting, analyzing, and presenting digital
evidences about the attack and intrusion detection system can be used to produce the
evidences that can be used as evidence. Intrusion detection system is one of the most
important and popular sources of digital evidence as it enables the administrator
to collect the evidence about the attack by providing the information about the
attack. The evidences collected with the help of intrusion detection system are the
real time and practical one, as they are collected at the same time when an attack
is detected. Such evidences contain the most of the important information about
the attack such as network connection, running processes, open files, system calls,
the amount of data flowing, memory use, etc. The evidences produced by intrusion
detection systems directly are the documentary evidences and can be used in legal
proceedings with a testimony of the person responsible to generate such evidence.
On the other hand digital forensic techniques can be used in intrusion detection
process. This process is known as network forensics, which deals with volatile and
dynamic information. Network forensics generally have two uses. The first related
to security, in which network is monitored for anomalous traffic and intrusions
are identified. The second use of network forensics is related to law enforcement.
Network data is more unpredictable and volatile as compared to computer forensics,
where data containing evidence is generally preserved on disk.
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Literature review
Brian Cusack and Muteb Alqahtani [40] have proposed “Acquisition of evidence from
Network Intrusion detection systems”. This work evaluates the performance of
NIDS in wired networks under different workloads to find the evidential value of
the NIDS. The work shows that the performance of a network intrusion detection
system (NIDS) varies very much for different workloads. Performance evaluation is
done on the basis of few points given below:
 Number of packets lost due to high workload?
 Event data retention, how long event data can be retained.
 Complexity, NIDS can handle.
 The cost associated with the system.
 Feasibility of the evidence (generated by NIDS) in legal proceedings.
First four points relies on stress testing, whereas last point relies on empirical testing.
A testbed has designed with numerous tests to check where NIDS perfomed well in
collecting digital evidence and where they need improvements. Work has tested
three different NIDS Snort, Suricata, and Bro-IDS for two different types of attack
named SQL Injection and Cross site scripting. Six different data rates (0.4 Mbps,
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10 Mbps, 30 Mbps, 60 Mbps, 80 Mbps, and 100 Mbps) were used in the experiment.
The results were the alarms on intrusion.
This work found that detection capability of NIDS decreases quickly on increasing
workload. Also, when attack’s complexity increased the detection capability of NIDS
fell more quickly. Number of packet loss of NIDS increased with the workload. The
greatest packet loss was found in snort up to 80%, whereas up to 10% in the Bro–IDS
and Suricata. NIDSs show many variations in complexity test. Only Bro-IDS detects
all cross scripting attacks at 10 Mbps and no NIDS could detect any cross scripting
attack at 100 Mbps. Suricata also shows better performance in this test. Cost of
CPU utilization is more in case of Suricata and Bro-IDs as compared to Snort. All
the evidence generated by NIDSs are tested under Daubert criteria and accepted in
the IT security community.
The main question asked in this work: What is the evidential value of NIDS? The
answer can be given in two parts. First is that the evidence from NIDS are better
prepared for forensics post event fashion and to prevent the intrusion occurrence as
compared to the evidences from system log files. However NIDS failed to give the
required performance when heavy workload and complex attacks are applied. The
conclusion of the work is that the NIDS have weak evidential value for both system
improvement and legal admissibility.
Jorge Herrerias and Roberto Gomez [41] have proposed “A log correlation model
to support the evidence search process in a forensic investigation” to correlate the
logs coming from diverse log files of various applications. Log files are the primary
wellspring of information for forensic examination process in many systems. The
information provided in the log files is used to find the information about the
attack and such information can be used as evidence. Log files are written by
some application (such as intrusion detection system) and contain the information
about system activities. When a huge amount of logs is recorded in log files from
one or more applications then analysis of such massive logs is very complicated task
for system forensic investigators. Most of the logs in such huge log file collection are
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not related to attack, that’s why there are more burdens on the investigator to find
the relevant logs from this big collection, which is very complicated. To overcome
this problem, this work proposed a model to correlate the logs coming from various
log files to assist the forensic investigator in evidence searching process.
The model proposed in this work contains a set of modules for collection, filtration,
normalization and correlation of the logs from numerous log files. First module
collects logs from various files and store in a container. After storing the log files
at the same place events are filtered in order to reduce the number of events. After
filtering, events are normalized to bring all the events in the same common format as
logs from various applications may have different formats. Finally, the normalized
events are used to reassemble the actions, though event correlation. In correlation,
relationships are assigned between many related events. In the correlation process
events are linked to recreate the attack sequence. By correlation process, attacker’s
actions can be identified and hence attackers can be traced. This work used three
types of correlation approaches, rule based, pre-condition, and post-condition. In
rule based correlation, scenarios of known attack are applied to detect a specified
attack. Another approach correlates alerts, if the pre-conditions of a later alerts
are fulfilled by the post-conditions of some prior alerts. A specialized language
LAMBDA is used to define these pre and post conditions. By using this model now
forensic investigator can recreate the attack scenario, and only needs to focus on the
effective part of the system instead of looking in all the systems.
This work has an advantage that forensic investigator can search the evidence
efficiently without doing a lot of searches by using the proposed model. The forensic
analysis of a large network can be done easily by using this model. However this
paper doesn’t provide the log translation process, used in normalization. Also
specialized language LAMBDA need an expertise to define pre and post condition
properly.
Ali Reza Arasteh, Mourad Debbabi, Assaad Sakha, and Mohamed Saleh [42]
have proposed “Analyzing multiple logs for forensic evidence”. This work proposed
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a model for formalization of forensic analysis of logs collected from multiple
applications. Proposed model intended for proper automatic analysis of multiple
logs in order to provide fast and efficient forensic analysis. The model uses two
approaches, first approach is for representation of log events and properties logically,
and the other is for proper automatic analysis of logs to search a specific event
pattern. The approach used here is based on the computational logics and formal
verification.
In the proposed model a tree is created from set of logs to be analyzed where the
labels of the tree are the events extracted from logs where every event is a conceptual
perspective of the applicable information present in the logs. Nodes of the tree
brings into a common structure by expressing the events in terms of the multi-sorted
term algebra, whose signature is chosen is such a way that it includes all relevant
information necessary for forensic analysis. This approach is very useful when logs
are collected from different system because logs from the different systems may have
different syntaxes. Using this approach all logs are modeled in common structured
events and then such events can be analyzed easily. Properties of this model were
expressed by a specialized formal language ADM. The properties of logs are shown
through the utilization of a logic containing, modal, temporal, computational and
dynamic characteristics. Proposed model has tested for the denial of service attack
(SYN attack). They have used the logs generated by the snort and find the SYN
attack entry in the log file and then analyze by using the proposed model and
successfully reconstruct the attack.
The model proposed in the work is very useful in automatic analysis and verification
of the multiple logs. Work enables the forensic investigator to efficiently and quickly
analyze the logs in order to find the evidence about the attack or reconstruct the
attack. Work can be improved by providing security to log files as log files can be
subject to change.
Ya-Ting Fan and Shiuh-Jeng Wang [43] have proposed “Intrusion Investigations
with Data-hiding for Computer Log-file Forensics” to protect the log files from
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alteration. This work proposed the concept of steganography to forensic analysis
of logs for preservation of reliability and completeness of the digital evidence. As
common security mechanisms, like an intrusion detection system back up the logs,
but doesn’t provide the security to the logs. An attacker who intrudes into the
system can also modify or destroy the logs and making it impossible to preserve the
evidence about the intrusion. This proposed technique uses steganography to secure
the logs from modification or deletion.
Generally logs generated in organizations are transferred to the secured centralized
log server for better security, but intruders can damage the logs during the transfer
from systems to log server. To avoid this, work proposed a model in which instead
of sending the log files to centralized server every working system itself keeps its
log files. To preserve the log files in individual computers, log file’s text is hided
into an image by using steganography. The LSB hidden technique was used in this
work to hide the log files into the image. This image is now stored in the individual
computer, but attacker will not be able to find the original file in the system so
the log files can safely remain in the computers. After intrusion when an intruder
tries to alter the log file records, he will search for the IP where logs are stored (i.e.
Trace logs). In the proposed model a copy of the hidden file is sent to trace log
and allow an intruder to alter or delete the log file. After completion of intruder’s
action incompleteness will lead in log files due to alteration by an intruder. Altered
log file is compared with the hidden secured log file and differences are found, such
differences are probably the evidences about the attack.
The proposed model consists of four modules generate log, log backup, log view,
and deliver log. Generate log hides information into 512512 gray scale image where
every 8 image bit hide 3 information bits. Log backup, back-up the log files from
computers to protect them. Log view displays the hidden files. Deliver log send the
log file to log trace, send alerts to the administrator on alteration, and compare the
altered file with original one to find the evidence.
The model proposed in the work is very useful because it preserves the completeness
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and reliability of the evidence by protecting the log files from modification. The
model also reduce the uses of the network resources as it stores the log files in the
computer itself instead of transferring to log server hence reduce the transfer cost.
The model can be used for real time detection. Although work has given a good
model to preserve the evidence, but it has some limitation such as if log files are
stored in individual computer then memory in every individual computer should
be large. This work has also not given the detailed procedure of steganography
technique to hide the information in the image.
Fahmid Imtiaz [44] has studied the “Intrusion Detection System Logs as Evidence
and Legal Aspects”. This study focuses on the potential of using an intrusion
detection system generated logs in legal as evidence in legal proceedings. As IDS
can be used to detect the attack by tracking the trails left by an intruder during
the reconnaissance. In reconnaissance step attack tries to probe and gather the
information about the available ports or services on the network in order to launch
the attack. However, government laws many times act as a hindrance in observing
the private network due to some conflicting issues discussed in the Commonwealth
Telecommunication Interception Act. Government legislators don’t consider the
intrusion detection system as a security tool and IDS logs as valid evidence. This
study discusses the legislation rules in Australia, the United States, and the United
Kingdom for using intrusion detection system logs as evidence.
In this study dimensions for conducting forensic investigation process from the
intrusion detection system logs are given. According to which computer security
community (i.e. IDS) lacks in awareness of two well-known principle of forensic
process, principles of continuity and the principles of audibility. The study also
focuses on the some tests such as admissibility, validity, and weight, that an evidence
should pass to be used in legal proceedings. One more issue is discussed in the study
is ‘acontextual’ presentation of log entries which may lead to misinterpretation of
significance of log file entries or whole log file. Notable strengths and limitations
of IDS as evidence are also given in the study. Strengths are, IDS logs are directly
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potential documentary evidence, IDS performs real time analysis, and provides fault
tolerance to the secured organizations. One limitation is that IDS are also susceptible
to attacks and IDS logs can also be modified and hence completeness and reliability
of log evidences is not trustworthy. Another limitation is the capability of IDS to
survive with huge amount and high speed data. The study also discussed about the
challenges such as false positive, false negative, handling encrypted data, OS specific
application protocols, and periodically policy or rules update in IDS.
Finally study comes at the conclusion that the legislation limits the use of IDS logs
as forensic evidence and the legislations need to change in order to use the logs as
evidence. The legal aspect and value of using IDS logs as evidence will change if the
legislature permits the companies to intercept communications legally.
Leonard Kwan, Pradeep Ray and Greg Stephens [45] have proposed “Towards a
Methodology for Profiling Cyber Criminals”. This work proposed an approach using
honeynets to collect legally valid evidences from cybercrime. Due to lack of effective
methodologies of collecting evidence and prosecute the attacker, many cybercrimes
go unpunished. Proposed approach addresses this problem by using generation-III
honeynet. This study predominantly focuses on the data analysis phase of the
digital forensic model with the notion of criminal profiling, cybercrime profiling and
cybercrime-cybercriminal correlation.
Criminal profiling is an investigative and behavioral tool that is proposed to help
forensic investigators to predict and profile the characteristics of unknown criminal
subjects accurately. Two types of criminal profiling are discussed in the study.
This work uses behavioral evidence analysis (BEA) profiling technique. Cybercrime
profiling is discussed in four dimensions breadth, depth, vulnerabilities, and tools.
Breadth is a metric used to measure the range or scope of the intrusion. Depth
is same as breadth, but it focuses measure the degree of intrusion of the network
intrusion. Vulnerabilities are the flaws and weaknesses in a system that allows an
attacker to compromise it. Tools are simply the software that is utilized to exploit
vulnerabilities. Proposed approach gives a conceptualization of a cybercriminal as a
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container for holding cybercrimes. Cybercriminal-cybercrime correlation is a method
to associate cybercrimes with their perpetrator to add precision and detail to the
cybercriminal’s profile. Each cybercrime profiles from cybercriminal profiles can
be compared with a test cybercrime profile and similarity index can be calculated.
Similarity index lies between 0 to 1, with 0 as greater difference and 1 is no difference.
Snort IDS is for cybercrime profiles and criminal profiling is simply done in relation
databases.
The given approach is very useful to correlate the detected cybercrime with the
cybercriminals that has already profiled in the database. This correlation helps the
investigator or security person to take action on the criminals. However approach
proposed in the work is very time and resource consuming as the process repeats
for each entry of a criminal profile to compare a single crime. A knowledge-base
or expert system is needed to correlate the profiles with an attack signature, which
need both cost and efforts.
Collie and Byron [46] have studied “Intrusion Investigation and Post-Intrusion
Computer Forensic Analysis”. This paper gives an overview of the investigation
and handling of security incidents, from the perspective of a legal administrative
investigator. This work proposes a prologue to the investigation of intrusions and
likewise portrays various post-intrusion computer forensics methodology and tools.
This includes incident response, intrusion investigation, real-time intrusion
investigation, post-intrusion forensics, and intrusion reconstruction. In incident
response network security framework requires successful identification of attackers,
as well as suitable response to them to with. Incident response activities may
comprise access denial to an attacker, reporting of incident to the appropriate
person or team, restraining the activities of an attacker, proceeding operation to
accumulate extra information and restoring the influenced system. Next is intrusion
investigation, which includes efficient accumulation of information produced by
application, system, network, and client activities that is vital in intrusion detection,
leading investigations to preserve evidence so that it can be used in court. Real-time
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intrusion investigation reveals the intent of intruder, which may help with assessing
and restricting the dispersal of the bargained information. Post-Intrusion Computer
Forensics is a process of forensic analysis when evidences are collected. It comprises
various methods, the first one is chronological event and evidence registers which
documents the attacker’s suspected actions and the site’s responses enumerating
what is suspected, what the site did and who was reached accordingly. Second
is frosty the Scene in which the compromized system is turn off and restart from
backups. Last is intrusion reconstruction, which involves correlation and analysis of
all recovered data regarding the intrusion.
This paper is useful because it describes the procedure of intrusion detection and
then use of the detected event in forensic analysis, provides the different methods
of intrusion detection such as log file analysis, File integrity assessment, intruder
artifacts, network transaction auditing which helps to system administrator in the
complete investigation process. The limitation of this work is that it fails to give
the algorithms and tools needed for effective handling of an intrusion. Details about
tools and algorithms for doing intrusion investigation and implementation should be
given in order to improve it.
Stephenson and Peter [47] have studied “The application of intrusion detection
systems in a forensic environment”. This paper describes the framework to explore
the applicability of IDS in process of collection and management of digital. This
work reviews the performance and forensic appropriateness of numerous types of
IDSs. During the research on ‘application of IDS in digital forensics’ two points of
view have emerged. One viewpoint says that collection and preservation of forensic
evidence in the case of a computer and network security incident to be unsuitable
for an IDS. Another viewpoint says that an IDS is the most possible candidate for
collecting original evidentiary data for forensic analysis in real or near real time.
Use of IDS with digital forensics begs a number of questions and these questions are
discussed in this paper are:
 Can IDS perform effectively if it also has to manage evidential data properly
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to meet legal standards?
 What is required for automatic management of data from an evidential
perspective?
 What features need to be added to IDS to ensure that it can perform as an
IDS as well as it can manage evidence properly?
This work proposed an approach consists of three phases. First is the Current
state in which detailed research and cataloging of prior formal work in forensics and
intrusion detection is done and it also governs the general impact of management
of forensic evidence on an IDS. The second phase is Theoretical model in which
analysis and modeling of forensic process and IDS is done, a combined theoretical
model for intrusion detection in forensic environment is created, and an appropriate
architecture is designed using SABSA method. The final phase is laboratory
demonstration in which the test bed and combined model generated in previous
phases are used to measure the impact of forensic analysis on the optimized IDS.
This study is very useful to understand the use of IDS in forensics because this paper
gives the detailed description about how an IDS is applicable is digital forensics also
discusses on the issues arrives when use IDS for collecting the evidences about the
intrusion and the legacy of the evidences generated by IDS. This study provides a
theoretical model for using an intrusion detection system in computer forensics. It
has some limitation such as this study only provides the theoretical model, but fails
to the detail about the implementation of that and it also doesn’t give the criteria
about which type of evidence generated by IDS are legal for investigation. This can
be improved by describing the tools and/or algorithm for implementing the model.
Kymie, Thompson, and Ruighaver [48] have studied “Intrusion detection systems
and a view to its forensic applications”. This study gives a view of forensic
application within the Intrusion Detection framework, and anomaly based IDS was
used for most of the work. As indicated by this paper machine security could
be divided into the methods that endeavour to anticipate security breaches, and
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those that endeavour to identify security violations. Both areas are extremely
essential in the model of system security. The ultimate goal of forensic application
is to get sufficient evidence to catch the criminal. In a computer system, cover
of secrecy energize offenders by making ruinous conduct easy while making it
amazingly troublesome for law authorities to demonstrate the identity of the
criminal. Accordingly the ability to get a fingerprint of system users and their
common conduct is definitive with a specific end goal to get some hang on recognizing
the criminal.
The information available in log files can be used as evidence. In any case, often at a
higher level, it is desired to have a more in-depth ability to restrict the field or even
generate a list of conceivable suspects. At this level, it is not sufficient to have logging
activities to find evidential data, but also some artificially intelligence techniques are
required to assemble and make profiles of system users. This paper demonstrates
that it is conceivable to accomplish effective results by utilizing simple variations of
the feed forward network with available information of the user’s behaviour. Thus,
numerous customary issues in-built to Intrusion Detection and to neural networks
have been overcome.
This work suggests an important application of IDS in digital forensics due to some
reasons such as evidence is collected from the system log file which is comparatively
easy. Work also gives an idea to use complex neural networks that will also be able to
identify the perpetrator. An automated anomalous user behavior detection system
will help to relieve a burden (sometimes unrealistic) from systems administrators.
Automated systems are helpful during a violation as well as turn to be a very helpful
forensic tool. At the same time it has some limitations such as evidence collected
from the log files can only be used to learn the behavior of user, but not able to
identify the intruder and paper doesn’t have any detail about the neural networks
used. Instead of using the log files for evidence collection system image (memory
image and running processes) can be used to improve the system.
Sommer [49] has studied “Intrusion detection systems as evidence”. This paper
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discussed that how IDS could be utilized as evidence in criminal and civil lawful
processes. This study explains two determinants for acceptance of evidence in legal
process and determinants are weight and admissibility. Discussion about the issues
of courts in managing novel scientific evidence and the difference in the legal and
scientific proof is given. Evaluation criteria of IDSs as wellsprings of legal evidence
are given, including protection and continuity of evidence and the transparency
and trust of forensic technique. According to the procedure, known as adversarial,
Evidence needs to pass two tests: first is admissibility (it must follow certain
legitimate rules which are utilized by a judge) and second is weight (it must be
justifiable and must be an attractive persuading to the court, it may be a jury or a
judge).
Numerous sorts of evidences that may be exhibited in court is real, documentary,
testimonial derived and expert are discussed in the paper. The evidence produced
by an IDS are the logs which come under the category of documentary evidence,
such evidence requires the testimony of responsible person for setting up the system
and for gathering the evidential logs which are brought before a court as evidence.
The evidence must have certain attributes such as Authenticity, Accurateness and
Completeness. Some bullet points are given about the IDSs as sources of Evidence
for Digital forensics:
 The quality of IDS relies on upon the degree to which it gives convenient and
precise data.
 Evidence acquisition is a different yet related activity.
 If logs are generated by IDS then a prosecutor must be ready with complete
details about the tool, its configuration and working.
 Logging evidence or anything produced by computer will need to formally
prepare the testimonial by the individuals personally included, to the court.
 Logging evidence should always be the best that is immediate from the system
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where it was found.
IDS can help this prosecution just cover the initial two points or in the greater part
of the cases just second point.
This work is very useful because this gives the evaluation criteria of IDSs as sources
of legal evidence, discussed about the legal acceptability of evidence by providing
two determinants (admissibility and weight) of legacy and clearly describes, types
of evidences are acceptable in court and how IDS fits in this. However, this research
fails to give an explanation about the collection of such evidence those are accepted
by the courts and also, does not gives the solution for generating reports of the legal
evidences from the raw data captured by IDS. This can be improved by giving the
description about the collection of acceptable evidences and the report generation
and appropriate methods or tools for doing so.
Barhate and Jaidhar [50] have proposed “Automated digital forensic technique
with intrusion detection systems”. In this paper, automated Digital Forensic
Technique with Intrusion Detection System is proposed according to which technique
once IDS detects an intrusion, it sends an alert message to administrator followed
by invoke the digital forensic tool to capture the state of the system. The captured
image can be presented as evidence in the court to prove the damage. IDS is used to
detect the intrusion But IDS function is limited to detection as well as response. The
IDS is unable to capture the state of the system when an intrusion is detected. Hence,
it fails to preserve the evidences in original form against the attack. New security
strategy is very much needed to preserve the reliability and completeness of evidence
for later investigation. The limitations of previous log file approaches are that it is
unable to capture the evidence of the attack. So it is not possible to preserve the
log file damage for forensic analysis and evidence cannot be collected immediately
against the attack to prove in the court of law. To overcome this limitation, in
this work automated Digital Forensic Technique with Intrusion Detection System
was proposed. Digital forensics play an important role by giving experimentally
demonstrated techniques to collect, process, translate and use digital evidence to
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bring a definitive depiction of the attack.
In this technique IDS is deployed on the target host which has crucial data.
IDS continuously monitor incoming traffic and analyze it to classify whether it is
malicious or not. If traffic is not malicious then IDS allows it and let the activity to
take place, but if the traffic is malicious then it generates alert message to system
administrator as well as the log server (a system where a periodic back up of log files
are stored) and at the same time IDS activate the digital forensic tool to capture the
current state (RAM and log file image) of the system. Then this image is compared
with previously stored image and if both are same then it ensures that an intrusion
has taken place. Hence the captured image is analyzed with to find the evidence
against the attack and corresponding report is generated.
This work is very useful to understand how IDS is used to collect the evidence about
the attack because it provides the process of digital forensics report generation with
the help of Intrusion detection system. This work provides the complete flowchart
for generating report of the system when an intrusion takes place and the process
of report generation is automatic. As the report is generated by analyzing the
current system image (memory, processes) so it gives the better then log file analysis.
However work doesn’t give the way to use the report as evidence in the digital forensic
investigation. This work uses signature based IDS so it is only able to detect the
known attacks, but not novel one.
Challenges
 Evidence preservation: Intrusion Detection System function is limited to
detection as well as response but IDS is unable to preserve the evidences against
the attack in original form.
 Integrity: Current IDSs are not able to protect the integrity of the
information which is needed for finding digital evidence.
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 Completeness: It is difficult to maintain the completeness of an evidence as
computer files (log files) can be altered.
 Novel attack detection: Model with signature based IDS is only able to
detect known attacks but not new attacks.
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Proposed Model for Automatic
Evidence Collection
Proposed model named “Application of IDS in automatic evidence collection using
digital forensics” can be used to automatically collect the information about the
attack detected by anomaly based intrusion detection system whenever an attack
occurs and then analyze the collected information to get evidence. The fundamental
work of an IDS is to detect the attack and respond to the system administrator. This
limits IDS to preserve the detailed information about the attack and hence about
the attacker. IDS alone is unable to give any information about the techniques
and tools use in the attack by the attacker and also not able to trace the attacker.
The intrusion detection system is also not able to give any information about what
and how much amount of damage to the system is done by particular attack. To
overcome this problem we have proposed a model in which digital forensic tool is
used along with intrusion detection system. This digital forensic tool will capture
the memory image of the system in order to preserve the information about the
intrusion. Proposed model gives the way to automatically trigger the digital forensic
tool whenever the intrusion detection system alerts an intrusion. Two models are
given below first by using signature based intrusion detection system and other is by
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using anomaly based intrusion detection system. In the following section we have
discussed system model, flowchart, tools used, and type of attack used for both the
models.
3.1 Model with Signature based IDS
3.1.1 System model and Assumptions
System model with signature based IDS is shown in Figure 3.1 [50]. The function of
each component is described below. Target host is a system that is to be protected
from the attacker or intruder. This system consist of valuable assets such as data
files, credential information, databases, system files, logs and many more important
things that have to be protected from the attackers.
Figure 3.1: System model with Signature Based Intrusion Detection System.
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Target host: This is the system that has to be protected from the attacks as it
has many valuable assets. Target host consists intrusion detection system, digital
forensic tool (memory acquisition tool), and forensic analysis tool (memory analysis
tool). This system runs under the supervision of the system administrator.
Intruder system: This is the system from where the intruder launches the attack
on the target host by sending the malicious packets. The intruder system consists
techniques and tools required to launch the attack.
Security center: This is the system from where the security administrator
monitors the target host. On intrusion occurrence an alert is sent to the security
center to notify administrator about the intrusion. An alert can be sent in various
ways, such as audio message, email, and message on console.
Intrusion detection system: To protect the target host some security
mechanism is needed that monitor the system continuously and detect the intrusion
whenever occurs. In this work IDS is used to secure the system, which inform
the security administrator about the attack and automatically activate the digital
forensic tool to capture the memory image of the system.
Signature based intrusion detection system is used in this model. Signature based
intrusion detection system is based on signature matching. Signature (or rules) of
known attacks written in the configuration file of the intrusion detection system
are matched with the new incidents to classify new event as an attack or normal
traffic. Signature based intrusion detection system has three main component,
packet capture unit, preprocessor unit, detection engine. The detection engine reads
the rules for known attack from rule file (or configuration file) using appropriate
plugins.
Logging system: Logging system the system used to store a copy of the log files
of the target host. Back up of target hosts log files is taken periodically (i.e. 12
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hours, 3 days, 2 weeks), and stored on this system to protect them from intrusion.
Digital forensic tool: Digital forensic tool is a framework to collect efficient and
forensically sound data from the attacked system. Digital forensic tools may be of
many types such as memory acquisition tool, disk capture tool. In our proposed
model we have used memory acquisition tool to capture the physical memory image
of the target host whenever an attack is detected on the system.
Forensic analysis tool: Forensic analysis tool is a set of utilities used to analyze
the information collected from the digital forensic tool, in order to find the digital
evidence. Forensic analysis tool generate the evidence from the collected information
which gives much information about the attack in an understandable format, and
such information is acceptable by the court in legal proceedings. There are numerous
types of forensic analysis tools such as, memory analysis tool, disk analysis tool,
email analysis tool, file and data analysis tool, registry analysis tool, application
analysis tool, etc. In our proposed model we have used a memory analysis tool
which will analyze the previously captured image.
3.1.2 Methodology
The methodology of the system model with signature based intrusion detection
system is given in following steps and pictorial representation of the same in the
form of flowchart is shown in Figure 3.2.
Steps
1. Signature based intrusion detection system is deployed on the target host which
has to be protected from intrusions or malicious activities. Target host contains
intrusion detection system, digital forensic tool, and forensic analysis tool.
2. IDS is deployed in such a way that all the traffic coming to the host must
pass through IDS. IDS monitors the incoming traffic continuously to detect
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Figure 3.2: Flowchart for model with Signature based IDS.
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unwanted traffic or malicious activity.
3. For every incoming packet, IDS generates and matches its signature (some
specific pattern that is defined as an attack in the rule file by the system
administrator) to the previously stored attack signatures to classify incoming
traffic as attack or normal. If the signature of incident traffic matches with any
of the stored signature, then that incoming traffic is classified as an attack.
4. If incoming traffic is classified as normal traffic then IDS simply allow it to
pass and corresponding activity to take place.
5. But if incoming traffic is classified as an attack that means an intrusion is
detected by IDS. Hence an alert message is sent to the security center to inform
the security administrator about the intrusion and notification also send to the
logging system to create an image of stored log files.
6. Simultaneously, digital forensic tool is activated to capture the current system
state in order to preserve the information about the attack for future analysis.
RAM (and log file) image is captured to get current system state which contains
all running processes, connections established, files altered or created and much
more information about the system when an attack is taking place.
7. To verify the attack newly captured log file image is compared with the image
created from the stored log file image. If both are identical, then there is no
intrusion means false alarm was given by IDS.
8. But if both images are not same then definitely an intrusion has occurred.
9. As intrusion has occurred, captured RAM image is now analyzed by using
forensic analysis (Memory analysis) tool to get useful information from RAM
image.
10. The information found from analysis can be used to create a report about the
intrusion. This report can be used as documentary evidence in court in legal
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proceeding. By default an HTML report is generated by the tool used here for
analysis.
3.1.3 Tools
Various tools have been used in model with signature based intrusion detection
system for different purposes. Name and description of the tools are as follows:
Snort: Snort is an open source, lightweight intrusion detection system that can
be used to monitor network to detect a variety of suspicious traffic coming to the
system. Lightweight means it can be easily deployed on any host. Snort is a rule or
signature based IDS which detects network attacks by performing content matching
and protocol analysis [51]. Snort architecture is divided into five modules are as
follows:
 The packet capture unit captures data packets from various network interfaces
and then transferred them to the upper layers of snort IDS. Packet capturing is
based on popular packet programming libpcap to provide a high level interface
to packet capture [52].
 Packet decoder is composed around the layers of the protocol stack introduce
in the upheld data link and TCP/IP protocol definitions. It fits data packet
into data structures to find the data link layer protocols, decodes IP, and
TCP/UDP to find relevant information (source and destination addresses and
port) from it. Detection speed of snort depends on this phase [52].
 Preprocessing unit modifies or arrange data packets before sending them to
the detection engine by normalizing protocol headers, detecting anomalies,
and reassembling packets. This unit works as a filter for identifying the things
to be checked later in the detection engine (i.e. too many TCP SYN, or
suspicious connection on TCP/UDP ports).
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 Detection engine, the heart of snort IDS is responsible for detecting intrusion
activities in a packet if exist. Snort employed rules for detection purpose,
maintained in a 2-D linked list as rule Headers and rule Options [51]. In a
snort rule, rule header includes list of common attributes (i.e. action to take,
IP and port addresses, direction of flow) and rule option includes detection
modifier options (i.e. pattern to match, flags, size, message to display). Rules
are searched and matched recursively against all packets in both directions for
the rule options which has been set in the rule file. If a packet matches any
rule defined in rule file, suitable action is taken; or else packet is treated as
normal data, and hence dropped by IDS [52]. Rule file and plugins are used
by snort to detect the intrusion. Rule file is a text file contains sets of rules
written with specific known syntax and plugins are the module used to identify
patterns in rule evaluation [53].
 Logging and alerting unit generates log messages and alerts depends upon
the rule header. Finally output module format notifications (log and alert)
and generate final output to user. The user can access the output from
various sources like databases, external files, syslog, WinPopup message, server
message block (SMB), alert file, console, and log files [52].
DumpIt: It is a memory acquisition tool to dump physical memory of windows
system in raw format. It is a combination of win32dd and win64dd in one executable
to capture memory image of both 32-bit and 64-bit system [54]. It can be easily
used with either user of administrator privileges by executing dumpIt.exe. DumpIt
generates a raw memory image with hostname and timestamp in the same directory
from where dumpIt is running.
Memgator: It is a memory analysis tool to get relevant information about the
system activities from captured memory image and also generates a report containing
this information. Memgator is a combination of various tools such as volatility,
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AESKeyFinder, and scalple file carver [55]. It supports almost all commands of very
popular memory analysis tool volatility such as, pslist to list number of processes,
and connections to get all network connections established by system at that time.
Memgator uses functionality of scalple carver that can carve for usernames and
passwords for Yahoo, Gmail, Facebook, Hotmail, and auto fill form entries for web
browser [37]. It can also extract encryption keys present in the memory file. Finally
memgator generate an HTML report which contains information about most of the
activities of system of investigator’s interest.
3.2 Model with Anomaly based IDS
3.2.1 System model and Assumptions
System model with anomaly based IDS for proposed approach is shown in Figure 3.3.
Most of the components like intruder system, target host, security center, digital
forensic tool, forensic analysis are already discussed under section system model
with signature based IDS. Intrusion detection system used in this model is different
from previous one.
Intrusion detection system: In this model anomaly based intrusion detection
system is used in which definitions of normal data behavior are stored and compared
with incident to categorize the incident as an intrusion or normal.
Anomaly based Intrusion detection system has three main components, packet
capture unit, Event engine, and policy layer mechanism. Intrusion detection system
is deployed on the target host so that all the traffic coming to that host will first
go to intrusion detection system. Intrusion detection system then decides whether
the traffic is normal or suspicious. If traffic is normal then the intrusion detection
system notifies the system administrator and activate digital forensic tool, otherwise
allow the traffic to simply pass and corresponding activity to take place.
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Figure 3.3: System model with Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection System.
3.2.2 Methodology
The following steps shows the working of the model with anomaly based IDS and
pictorial representation of the same is shown in the flowchart in Figure 3.4.
Steps
1. Intrusion detection system is deployed on the target host monitors the network
traffic continuously to protect the system from intrusions.
2. Packet capture unit catches data packets flowing through the channel and filter
them based on the filter written such as a filter to allow only tcp packets, filter
to allow only udp packets, filter to allow packets on or from any specific port
such as port 79 for finger, 21 for ftp, and 23 for telnet.
3. Packet captured by the packet capture unit are filtered and then sent to the
event engine to generate relevant events from the data streams. The packet
capture unit performs low level processing of the data coming from lower
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Figure 3.4: Flowchart for model with Anomaly based IDS.
layer. Low level processing involves management of connection states, various
application analysis, management of timers, data structure, scripts etc.
4. After analyzing the data packets Event engine raise an event and place it in
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a queue. Events are some relevant activities in the system or network such as
connection established is an event.
5. At the policy layer event handlers are written for almost every type of events.
Every time one event from the queue is taken and the corresponding event
handler from policy layer is called. This process continues until the queue
becomes empty, when the queue becomes empty interpreter waits for new
events to be placed in the queue.
6. Every time an event is analyzed with corresponding event handler and if
it violats the normal data behavior policies, then classified as an intrusion
otherwise simply allows to pass.
7. If an event is classified as an intrusion means intrusion has taken place in
the system and hence alert is sent to security center and digital forensic tool
is activated to dump the physical memory (RAM) of the system which will
contain useful information about the attack.
8. Once the physical memory image is captured, it can be analyzed with forensic
analysis tool to get the useful information such as number and name of the
processes running at the time of the intrusion, connections established, files
open or modified, system tables altered, etc.
9. A report can be generated from the information found in memory image
analysis. This report can be used as evidence (documentary type) in a legal
proceeding in order to punish the attacker.
3.2.3 Tools
Various tools have been used in our model with anomaly based intrusion detection
system for different purposes. Name and description of the tools are as follows:
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Bro-IDS: Bro is an open source anomaly based intrusion detection system
provides high speed monitoring, real time notification, clear separation between
mechanism and policy, and extensibility [56]. Bros architecture is mainly divided
in to two parts one is an event engine which converts lower level data streams into
higher level network events, and other is an interpreter which analyzes the network
events based on the system security policies. Security policies are written and stored
in the top layer of the Bro in a specialized scripting language bro. User (normally
system administrator) can define their own security policy by writing a script in bro
language to detect a particular attack. Clear separation between mechanism and
policy is the main power of Bro, and hence it is also called policy neutral. This
separation can be achieved in bro because event generation and policy definition are
done independently on two different layers.
Event engine of Bro performs various low level task to generate relevant higher
level network events from data streams [57]. Low level processing includes following:
 State management of network connections based on the SYN, FYN, and RST
packets.
 Transport layer analyzer, analyzes packets such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP
packets.
 Application layer analyzer, analyses packets, such as HTTP, SMTP, DNS, etc.
 Infrastructure which includes management of events and timer, data structure,
script interpreter etc.
Some common types of network events generated by the Bro’s event
engine are connection attempt, connection established, connection rejected,
connection finished, http request, login success, login failure, net weird [56] [57],
etc.
LiME: LiME is used as a digital forensic tool in our model. LiME stands for
Linux Memory Extractor. LiME is a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) that allows
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the acquisition of volatile memory from Linux and Linux-based devices [58]. LiME
supports memory acquisition to the disk or on the network by specifying the
port. In LiME, interaction beteen processes of kernel and user space is minimized
during memory acquisition. Due to less interaction forensically better memory
dump is produced. Multiple output formats are supported by LiME such as, raw
(concatenates all system ranges), lime (each range is prepended with a fixed size
header to contain address space information), and padded (pad all non-system RAM
ranges with 0).
Volatility: Volatility is used as a forensic analysis tool in our model. The Volatility
Framework is a set of tools designed for the extraction of digital information from
memory (RAM) dump. Volatility is implemented in Python. The techniques
performed for extraction are fully independent of the device or system being
enquired, but give much visibility of the state of the system at runtime [59].
Volatility is very popular because of some characteristics such as open source, run
on most of the operating systems, extensible and scriptable, coverage of many file
formats, fast and efficient algorithms, and designed with forensic focus. Volatility
contains a number of plugins for image identification, process memory, networking,
processes, DLLs, kernel memory, crash dumps, file system, and registry. For example
Linux pslist shows list of all processes running in the system and linux connections
shows all the connection established in the system.
Nmap: It is used on the intruder system to port scan the target host. Nmap
stands for Network Mapper is an open source utility for network discovery and
security auditing. Many network and system administrators also use Nmap for
managing upgradation schedules of services, inventory in network, and observing
service or host uptime. Nmap utilizes raw IP packets in novel ways to figure out
what hosts are accessible on the network, services (application name and version)
offerd by those hosts, operating systems they are using, firewalls/packet filters they
are using, and much more information of the host [60]. Nmap is designed to run on
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all major OS.
3.2.4 Port scan attack
Port scanning is a technique to enquire the network or system for open ports
and different services. The system administrator uses port scanning, for network
exploration to manage the network and also to recognize the precursors to serious
attacks. But for attackers, port scanning is helpful for finding information required
to launch an attack successfully [61]. Port scanning is scanning done by malicious
users searching for network vulnerabilities to discover the shortcomings of a host
by sending probes for the port. Scanning is an important phase in launching an
attack, and port scanning is the most popular one for it. Port scanning is of four
types, vertical scanning, horizontal scanning, strobe scanning, and block scanning.
In vertical scanning some or all ports on a single host are scanned, in horizontal
scanning single port (i.e. port 80) of multiple hosts is scanned, in strobe scanning
multiple ports of multiple hosts are scanned, and in block scanning all ports of
multiple hosts are scanned. Port scan detection is also divided into five categories,
algorithmic, soft computing based, threshold based, visual, and rule based. We have
used vertical port scanning and threshold based detection approach in our work.
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Results and Discussions
In this chapter implementation detail of both the models are given. Scripts and codes
used in bro and snort to detect the intrusion are given in this chapter. Program and
shell script, used to automate the digital forensic process when intrusion is detected
by IDS are also given. Tools and plugins used for memory analysis are discussed.
For both the models we have run system for 4 hours each and analyzed the real time
traffic to test our models. The number and types of alerts generated by IDS used
in both the models are given in bar charts. Some screenshots of results for both the
models are given. Finally a comparison of both models is given in the form of table
and graph.
4.1 Results for Model with Signature based IDS
Snort is an open source signature based intrusion detection system. In our
experimental work we have used Snort-2.6 for detecting intrusion. Snort is installed
on the target host “192.168.40.17”. Snort is configured by selecting a valid interface
card (i1) in my system.
Snort rules are written in snort.conf file inside etc directory of snort. Priorities of
alerts are defined in classification.conf and allowed signature IDs are configured in
threshold.conf. After configuration Snort is started by running following commands:
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snort –A console -i1 -c C:\snort\etc\snort.conf -l C:\snort\log
Above command capture packets by using i1 interface, analyze packet with rules
written in snort.conf and finally send the output on console as well as write alerts
in a log file in the log directory of snort.
In our work snort rule is written for detecting ICMP ping from a specific system
“192.168.40.18” (Intruder system) as an intrusion. Rule to detect ICMP ping as
the intrusion is written as follows:
alert icmp 192.168.40.18 any –>192.168.40.17 any (msg “Detected ICMP
ping on my system”; sid: 1000002)
Priority of alerts are defined by modifying classification.conf file. A sample entry
in classification.conf is as follows:
config classification: icmp-event,Generic ICMP event,3 Threshold.conf is
configured to suppress the events which we want to ignore. Sample entry in
threshold.conf is as follows:
suppress gen id 120, sig id 3
Configuration file Snort.conf file is configured to set the mode in which output of
snort to be sent. In our work we have sent output in three modes email, console
and writing in the alert file. Screenshot of alert messages on the console is shown
in Figure 4.1. Same alert entry will be written in alert file alerts.ids file by snort.
When an entry containing “Detected ICMP ping on my system” is made in alert.ids
means intrusion has detected by snort. A program was written to continuously
monitor alert.ids searching for a pattern “Detected ICMP ping on my system”. As
soon as this pattern is matched program code will execute memory acquisition tool
to capture the RAM image. This tool will dump memory in .raw format in the
current directory where it is stored. To capture memory image DumpIt-1.3.2 is
installed and configured on the target system. This memory acquisition tool will
be executed from the program automatically when alert containing intrusion will
be written in alert.ids file. Screenshot of DumpIt capturing memory is given in
Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Alert message on console.
Figure 4.2: DumpIt capturing the memory image.
Once the memory image was captured and stored in the specified directory, image
was analyzed by memory analysis tool Memgator for getting relevant information.
Some screenshots of results are given below. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 shows
a selction of tools in memgator and analysis of memory image respectively.
Figure 4.5 shows the home page of generated report, which contains basic details
about the system.
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Figure 4.3: Selecting plugins for analysis.
Figure 4.4: Analyzing memory image using memgator.
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Figure 4.5: Homepage of report.
Figure 4.6 shows active processes and Figure 4.7 shows all active TCP connections
in the system at the time when intrusion was occured. Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9
shows all open files in the system and loaded modules respectively.
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Figure 4.6: List of avtive processes.
Figure 4.7: Connections to the system.
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Figure 4.8: List of open files.
Figure 4.9: List of loaded modules.
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By analyzing the log and alert files of snort, we have found information about
the total number of alerts generated, and priority based division of alerts according
to snort.
 Total alerts: 5710
 Priority-1 alerts: 1880
 Priority-2 alerts: 1510
 Priority-3 alerts: 2120
Figure 4.10: Number of alerts generated.
We have analyzed information about some popular alerts that occurred very often
in Snort. ICMP ping, Bad segnment, and Consecutive small segments alerts were
generated by the snort more than others, 2115, 1420, and 1220 times respectively.
Other alerts such as ICMP destination unreachable, http inspects long header, and
web client portable alerts were generated 224, 910, and 16 times respectively. ICMP
ping alert indicates a ping request or reply from or to host. Bad Segment alert
indicates an anomalous packet detection by stream5 preprocessor. An occurrence of
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Figure 4.11: Types of alerts generated.
ICMP destination Unreachable alert means connection to a system was not available
when tried to connect. Web Client Portable alert means downloading of a portable
executable which may affact the system. Alert http inspect Long Header occurs
when http preprocessor detects an anomalous packet.
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4.2 Results for Model with Anomaly based IDS
Bro is an open source anomaly based detection system. In our experimental work,
we have used Bro-IDS 2.2 on target host “192.168.40.18” Linux Ubuntu 13.10. Port
scan from another system is considered as attack to test the proposed model. Bro is
installed on the target system and configured by modifying node.cfg, networks.cfg,
and broctl.cfg files in bro directory. After configuration, Bro is started by running
following commands:
root@ubuntu :/# sudo b r o c t l
Welcome to Brocontro l 1 . 2
Type h e l p f o r help
[ BroControl ] > s t a r t
S ta r t ing bro . . . . . .
After starting bro, it starts capturing packets by using the libpcap packet
capture library. Bro script (scan.bro) is written in a bro scripting
language to detect port scan attack. This script is kept in bro directory
/usr/local/bro/share/bro/site/scan.bro. Written script scan.bro is loaded from
another script /usr/local/bro/share/bro/site/local.bro. local.bro is the main entry
point in the bro which is managed by BroControl. Scan.bro is loaded by adding the
following lines into local.bro:
@load /usr/local/bro/share/bro/site/scan
Bro script for detecting port scan is written as follows:
export {
r ed e f enum Notice : : Type +=
{
PortScan ,
} ;
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const po r tScan Int e rva l = 4min &r ede f ;
const portScanThreshold = 25 .0 &r ede f ;
g l oba l Scan : : por tScanPo l i cy :
hook ( a t ta cke r : addr ,
t a r g e t : addr ,
scannedPort : port ) ;
}
event b r o i n i t ( ) &p r i o r i t y=4
{
l o c a l r1 :
SumStats : : Reducer =
[ $data=” s c a n f a i l ” ,
$use=se t ( SumStats : :UNIQUE) ,
$fix maximum=
doub l e to count (2+portScanThreshold ) ] ;
SumStats : : c r e a t e ( [ $name=”por t s cann ing ” ,
$epoch=portScanInterva l ,
$ r educe r s=se t ( r1 ) ,
$ t h r e sho l d va l ( key : SumStats : : Key ,
r e s u l t : SumStats : : Result ) =
{
return
r e s u l t [ ” s c a n f a i l ” ]
0.0+ $ f i x ;
} ,
$ th r e sho ld=portScanThreshold ,
$ thresho ldCrossed ( key :
SumStats : : Key , r e s u l t :
SumStats : : Result ) =
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{
l o c a l a = r e s u l t [ ” s c a n f a i l ” ] ;
l o c a l x =
S i t e : : i sLoca lAddr ( ta rg e t$hos t ) ?
” l o c a l ” : ” remote ” ;
l o c a l dur =
dura t i on t o m in s s e c s ( a$end−a$begin ) ;
l o c a l p r i n t =fmt (” %s Port Scan Attack Detected . .
%d d i f f e r e n t po r t s o f system %s has
scanned in %s ” , ta rget$host ,
a$unique , t a r g e t$ s t r , dur ) ;
NOTICE( [ $note=Port Scan ,
$ source=target$host ,
$de s t i na t i on=to addr ( t a r g e t $ s t r ) ,
$sub=x ,
$message=pr int ,
$ id=cat ( ta rg e t$hos t ) ] ) ;
} ] ) ;
}
Bro generates a number of alert files in /usr/local/bro/logs containing information
about various protocols, connections, scanning, summaries, etc. After packet
capturing and analyzing event against this script bro wrote alert message in notice.log
file. Screenshot of various alert files generated by bro is given in Figure 4.12 and the
notice.log alert file is given in Figure 4.13.
notice.log file contains a number of alerts with one alert showing “port scan attack
detected”. When bro puts this alert in notice.log means intrusion has detected. A
shell script automatic 1.sh was written to continuously monitor the notice.log file
for automatic activation of digital forensic tool to capture the current system state.
Code is written in shell script to search for pattern “Port Scan Attack Detected”
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Figure 4.12: Alert files generated by Bro.
and whenever this pattern is matched code is written to run memory acquisition
tool LiME to capture memory (RAM) image of the system.
Code used for pattern matching is as follow:
prev count=0
count=$ ( grep −c −w ”Port Scan ”
/ usr / l o c a l /bro/ spoo l /bro/ no t i c e . l o g )
i f [ ”$count ” −ne ” $prev count ” ] ; then
echo ” the r e i s i n t r u s i o n : Port Scan Attack Detected . . . ”
To capture memory image, LiME 1.1 is installed and configured on the target system
by compiling and writing a program to generate an object file to link with the kernel.
To run the LiME, following command is written in shell script:
insmod / usr / l o c a l / lime−f o r e n s i c s −1.1− r17 / s r c /
lime −3.11.0−17− g ene r i c . ko
”path=/usr / l o c a l /ram . lime $now format=l ime ”
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Figure 4.13: Entries in notice.log file.
Screenshot of running script to capture a memory image is given in Figure 4.14.
Once memory image is captured and stored in specified directory, it is analyzed by
very popular memory analysis framework Volatility 2.3. Some screenshots of results
are given below. Figure 4.15 shows all running processes, Figure 4.16 shows open
files, and Figure 4.17 shows entries in the system call table.
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Figure 4.14: Capturing memory image.
Figure 4.15: List of all active processes.
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Figure 4.16: List of all open files.
Figure 4.17: Entries in System call table.
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After running the second model, Bro-IDS generated 15 log files in the log
directory. Even some of the log files did not contain any information, but they
were created by Bro-IDS. Some log files such as notice.log, connection.log contains
information about alerts and connections. The total number of alerts and two
most often alerts in notice.log is shown in Figure 4.18. The total number of alerts
Figure 4.18: Alert generated in notice.log.
generated by Bro in notice.log were 1040, 420 of them were of type Oﬄine Resource
Stats, and 580 were of type Wierd Activity. Alert type Oﬄine Resource Stats
indicates the number of queued event and Weird Activity alert indicates packet in
which IPv4 not included. Another important log file is conn.log which contains all
connections from or to the target host. After analyzing conn.log file we found there
are 8140 total number of connections, 6650 http connections, 635 ssh connections,
and 210 SMTP connections.
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Figure 4.19: Connections in conn.log.
4.3 Comparison of Models
After analyzing the memory image of both the models, we found relevant
information of the system of the time when the attack occured. We have taken
some parameters from information to draw a comparison of the models. Parameters
are, number of active processes, number of active connections, number of open files,
number of device driver detected, number of loaded modules, number of hidden
processes, and the number of commands in command history. Number of processes,
connections and so on is given in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Models
Infor-mation
/Model
Number
of
processes
Number
of
Connections
Number
of
open
files
Number
of
device
drivers
Number
of
Loaded
Modules
Number
of
Hidden
Processes
Command
History
Model -1 128 53 1820 139 167 242 3
Model -2 203 68 1490 164 110 363 3
Graph in Figure 4.20 show comparison of information retrieved from both
the models.
Figure 4.20: Infromation retrieved from both models.
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Conclusion
In this work “Application of Intrusion Detection System in Automatic Evidence
Collection using Digital Forensics” is proposed by using both signature and anomaly
based intrusion detection system. In this work intrusion detection system is used to
detect intrusion and then current system image is captured by digital forensic tool.
Further, this captured memory image is analyzed by using forensic analysis tool. In
this work two models have been given, first model used signature based intrusion
detection and other is using anomaly based intrusion detection. In our experimental
study for first model, snort is used as intrusion detection system, DumpIt is used as a
digital forensic tool which capture RAM image of the system, and Memgator is used
as a forensic analysis tool which analyze image to find relevant information from it.
To test our model, rules were written in snort to detect ICMP ping as an intrusion
and Ping message from another system is sent. Our model has successfully detected
the intrusion and captured the memory image which was further analyzed by forensic
analysis tool and relevant information (i.e. running processes, connections) have
been collected.
In experimental study of the second model, Bro-IDS is used as intrusion detection
system, LiME is used as a digital forensic tool, and volatility is used as a forensic
analysis tool. To test this model a bro script is written and configured on the target
system, and port scanning is done from another system (intruder system) by using
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Nmap. Our model successfully detected the port scan attack and captured memory
image followed by the analysis of the image.
Finally a comparison of both models is given based on the alerts shown, connections
established, and information retrieved from memory image. Model with Bro-IDS is
better than the model with Snort because Bro-IDS is able to detect novel attacks
which cannot be detected by Snort.
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